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INTRODUCTION
This Note examines one of the more recent potential challenges that academia
has raised to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA): the minimum
Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) as an unconstitutional taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment. This Note argues that, under the appropriate constitutional analysis, the
MLR does not rise to the level of a taking.1
The ACA was enacted to address two primary problems in the American health-
care industry: access and affordability.2 Before the ACA was enacted, over 47 million
Americans—18% of the population—did not have health insurance.3 The main barrier
to coverage was cost: most people who did not have health care usually did not have
access to employer health insurance, and could not afford to purchase it on their own.4
Additionally, lack of coverage was a long-term problem for most uninsured, with 47%
reporting that they had been uninsured for five years or more, and 18% reporting that
they had never had any coverage at all.5 Uninsured Americans had few ways to get
affordable health care. Most Americans obtain health insurance through their em-
ployer, but 80% of uninsured Americans had no access to employer insurance, and
most of the remaining 20% reported that the employer insurance was too expensive.6
Despite the number of uninsured individuals, over the last thirty years, healthcare
spending in the United States has snowballed.7 Americans spend more per year on
1 See infra Part IV.
2 ObamaCare Summary: Obama Health Care Summary, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://
obamacarefacts.com/obamahealthcare-summary/ [http://perma.cc/FZ5S-Q39V] [hereinafter
ObamaCare Summary].
3 Rachel Garfield, Rachel Licata & Katherine Young, The Uninsured at the Starting
Line: Findings from the 2013 Kaiser Survey of Low-Income Americans and the ACA, KAISER






7 If the U.S. healthcare system was a country, it would be the fifth largest economy in
the world. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Spending More Doesn’t Make Us Healthier, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINIONATOR (Oct. 27, 2011, 12:53 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/27
/spending-more-doesnt-make-us-healthier/ [http://perma.cc/39T8-W4L7].
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healthcare costs than people in any other country with comparable per capita income
levels.8 Additionally, the rate at which that number is growing is increasing quickly—
faster than overall economic growth and the rate of inflation.9 This means that each
year, Americans spend a larger percentage of their income on healthcare costs.
The ACA has many provisions designed to make insurance accessible to individ-
uals at a lower cost.10 However, the MLR is one of the only provisions that directly
targets the rising costs of health insurance.11 The MLR limits the amount of premium
dollars a health insurance company may spend on administrative costs, overhead, and
profit by requiring that companies spend a specified portion of the money they receive
in premium payments (85% for all large group business and 80% for all small group
and individual business) on paying claims and quality healthcare improvements.12 The
constitutional challenge to the MLR lies in the effective cap the MLR puts on profits
by requiring health insurers to spend a large, specific portion of their total revenue
on health-related and nonadministrative expenses, unconstitutionally limiting the
rate of return that health insurers can receive, and violating the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
Although the ACA has attracted a lot of attention since its passage in 2010, very
little work has examined the MLR.13 Moreover, none of the work has examined the
MLR as a taking under any doctrine other than that applied in the public utility rate-
making context. This Note argues that the public utility analysis is not the appropriate
analysis to apply to the MLR.14 Public utilities have a unique status as monopolies.
Because of this status, they are highly regulated, partially in order to approximate
the rates that would occur in a competitive market.15 The balance to this rate regulation
is that they are granted a constitutionally protected rate of return on their investment.16
8 Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United States & Selected OECD Countries,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-health
-care-spending-in-the-united-states-selected-oecd-countries/ [http://perma.cc/4XZQ-VUNP].
9 Id. In 1980, Americans spent 9% of the GDP on healthcare spending; in 2008, they
spent 16% of the GDP. Id.
10 See infra notes 52–58 and accompanying text (discussing ACA provisions designed
to lower the cost of insurance for individuals previously unable to purchase insurance).
11 See ObamaCare Rate Review & The 80/20 Rule, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacare
facts.com/obamacare-rate-review-80-20-rule/ [http://perma.cc/55H6-DYBL] (“ObamaCare’s rate
review provision and the 80/20 rule help curb premium growth and keep insurance affordable.”).
12 See infra notes 62–81 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Part II.B.
14 See infra Part IV.A.
15 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance
Reform: Why the Reid Bill Is Unconstitutional, MED. PROGRESS TODAY (Dec. 18, 2009),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/epstein121809 [http://perma.cc/QXS7-P6TU].
16 See generally Richard A. Epstein & Paula M. Stannard, Constitutional Ratemaking
and the Affordable Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 243,
265–66 (2012).
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In contrast to public utilities, health insurance companies exist in a highly competi-
tive—albeit also highly regulated—market. The constitutional analysis that applies to
public utilities is thus not appropriately applied to health insurance companies. Any
insurance company rate regulation should be examined under the general regulatory
takings standard governed by Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.17
Under this constitutional analysis, the MLR does not rise to the level of an unconsti-
tutional taking.18
Part I will provide an overview of the sections of the ACA that are relevant in
examining the effect the MLR will have on health insurance companies.19 Part II will
provide a brief overview of the existing scholarship regarding the MLR, addressing
why the MLR is a legitimate constitutional issue and including a discussion of the
leading arguments for its unconstitutionality.20 Part III will give an overview of the
constitutional doctrine of takings, specifically examining the different analyses applied
to public utilities and regulatory takings.21 Part IV will argue that the regulatory
takings analysis is the analysis that should be applied to any constitutional challenge
of the MLR as a taking and will discuss why the MLR does not rise to the level of a
taking under that analysis.22
I. EXPLANATION OF THE ACA
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act23 (ACA) was signed into law by
President Obama on March 23, 2010, after passing the Senate with a vote of 60–39,24
and the House with a vote of 219–212.25 The ACA has been a source of controversy
and contention since its inception.26 Since it passed in 2010, House opponents of the
law have led fifty-four votes to overturn, defund, or limit the law.27 There is a website
17 438 U.S. 104 (1978) [hereinafter Penn Central].
18 See infra Part IV.B.
19 See infra Part I.
20 See infra Part II.
21 See infra Part III.
22 See infra Part IV.
23 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
[hereinafter ACA].
24 H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/s396 [http://perma.cc/7N8D-XQMJ]
25 H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2010/h165 [http://perma.cc/Y3HU-EMG9].
26 See, e.g., Julie Rovner, At Age 3, Affordable Care Act is No Less Controversial, NAT.
PUB. RADIO (Mar. 23, 2013 6:18 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/03/23/17509
9334/at-age-3-affordable-care-act-is-no-less-controversial [http://perma.cc/8VVJ-Y2AM].
27 Ed O’Keefe, The House Has Voted 54 Times in Four Years on Obamacare, WASH. POST
(Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/21/the-house-has
-voted-54-times-in-four-years-on-obamacare-heres-the-full-list/ [http://perma.cc/T7RB-ZEWN].
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devoted entirely to tracking and discussing pending and decided legal challenges to
the legislation.28 This website reports sixty separate lawsuits challenging various as-
pects of the ACA.29
In addition to being controversial, the law is complex. It is over one thousand
pages long and contains the most extensive reforms of the health insurance industry
since the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.30 Through its complex and com-
prehensive regulation, the ACA essentially regulates two major areas: (1) individual
and employer participation in the healthcare market, and (2) health insurers’ behavior
in the healthcare industry.31
A. Individual Regulation32
The most widely discussed individual reform in the ACA is the Minimum Essential
Coverage Provision, or individual mandate.33 The individual mandate “requires most
Americans to maintain ‘minimum essential’ health insurance coverage.”34 The effect
of the provision is to force individuals who currently do not pay for health insurance to
purchase health insurance (at a subsidized rate if their income is low enough) or pay
a penalty.35
In order to manage this mass influx of consumers in the market for insurance, the
ACA created State Exchange Programs to “facilitate[ ] the purchase of qualified health
plans.”36 The only way for insurers to access consumers who qualify for federal subsi-
dies is by joining the State Exchange Program.37
28 HEALTHCARELAWSUITS.ORG, http://healthcarelawsuits.org/ [http://perma.cc/LZM7
-J769] (“Health Care Lawsuits is an informational resource on legal challenges to the Affordable
Care Act.”).
29 HEALTHCARELAWSUITS.ORG, http://healthcarelawsuits.org/case-archive.php [http://
perma.cc/V4XR-RDBB]. Many are multistate lawsuits that consolidate numerous plaintiffs
suing about the same issue. See id.
30 Scott E. Harrington, U.S. Health-Care Reform: The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 77(3) J. RISK & INS. 703, 703 (2010).
31 See, e.g., ObamaCare Summary, supra note 2 (“Obamacare . . . reforms the health insur-
ance industry and the American health care system as a whole. The law . . . give[s] Americans
more rights and protections and expand[s] access to affordable quality healthcare . . . .”).
32 This Note will briefly discuss the individual regulations that are necessary to understand
the effect of the MLR as a whole, but it will focus on the regulations that affect health insurers’
behavior in the healthcare industry as that is the part of the law that is the most applicable
to the MLR. Additionally, although the ACA sets forth substantial regulations relating to em-
ployers, this Note will not discuss those regulations. A full discussion of the ACA is outside
the scope of this Note, and only those provisions that substantially affect the operation of the
MLR will be discussed.
33 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242–44 (2010).
34 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
35 Id.
36 § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173.
37 Id. Once a health insurance company has joined the State Exchange Program, it is subject
to extensive federal regulation. See generally Rebecca J. Kopps, Note, Dead on Arrival: The
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B. Health Insurance Company Regulation
The core analytical task of an insurance enterprise is identifying
future losses, choosing which of those losses it is willing to in-
sure, estimating the frequency and magnitude of those events, pre-
paring insurance contracts that reflect those choices, and then
deciding how much to charge which classes of people in return
for this protection.38
Although the individual participation side has, to date, received the most attention
and been the subject of the most controversy,39 the ACA’s federal regulation of health
insurance companies is just as unprecedented and just as far-reaching as its regula-
tion of individual behavior. The ACA regulates every major aspect of the health insur-
ance business and strongly limits the ways in which health insurers may engage in
each of the core analytical tasks of insurance.
1. Identifying Future Losses
The ACA heavily regulates health insurers’ underwriting process.40 Insurance
underwriting is “[t]he process of selecting risks and classifying them according to
their degrees of insurability so that the appropriate rates may be assigned. The process
also includes rejection of those risks that do not qualify.”41 Underwriting is generally
considered the way in which an insurance company manages the risk it takes on when
entering into an insurance contract: by accurately identifying how likely an individual
insured is to incur costs (make claims), the insurance company can charge that individ-
ual the appropriate amount for the insurance coverage.42
Prior to the passage of the ACA, insurers considered a variety of factors in de-
termining whether to grant coverage and what the rate of coverage would be for an
applicant. These factors included, among other things, an applicant’s age, gender,
and medical history.43 Health insurers also limited the risk they assumed in insuring
Health Insurance Industry’s Bleak Prognosis Due to Unconstitutional Ratemaking in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 577 (2011); Meghan S.
Stubblebine, The Federal Medical Loss Ratio: A Permissible Federal Regulation or an En-
croachment on State Power?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341 (2013); Epstein, supra note 15.
38 TOM BAKER & KYLE LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 16 (3d ed. 2013); see also 1
COUCH ON INSURANCE 16–18 (2014) (“Insurance has been defined . . . [as] a contract whereby
one party promises for a consideration to indemnify the other against certain risks.”).
39 See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
40 §§ 2701–2708, 124 Stat. at 155–61; see also Kopps, supra note 37, at 583–84.
41 LEO P. MARTINEZ & JOHN W. WHELAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GENERAL PRACTICE
INSURANCE LAW 8 (4th ed. 2001); see also Underwriting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014) (“The act of assuming a risk by insuring it.”).
42 See BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 38, at 1–11 (discussing risk, risk spreading, and moral
hazard, and how insurance companies manage those aspects of the business).
43 Kopps, supra note 37, at 583.
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individuals by including exclusions for preexisting conditions or cancelling individual
policies when the individual became riskier than the company’s initial assessment.44
Under the ACA, insurers may consider only four factors when setting rates:
whether the plan is an individual or family plan, geographic location, age, and to-
bacco use.45 An age rating may not increase an individual’s premium by more than
a factor of 3, and tobacco use may not increase an individual’s premium by more than
a factor of 1.5.46 Additionally, the ACA expressly prohibits health insurers from under-
writing on the basis of “health status,” “[m]edical condition (including both physical
and mental illnesses),” “[c]laims experience,” “[r]eceipt of health care,” “[m]edical
history,” “[g]enetic information,” “[e]vidence of insurability,” “[d]isability,” or “[a]ny
other health-status related factor determined appropriate by the Secretary.”47 This re-
moves from the health insurers the traditional factors used to assess an individual’s
risk and base premiums on that risk.
The effect of the ACA’s drastic limitations on health insurance underwriting is
twofold. One, health insurers no longer have a way to ensure that the premiums they
charge individuals are commensurate to the amount of claims that an individual will
be making.48 In addition, the risk of adverse selection49 in individuals purchasing health
insurance is much higher under the ACA because health insurers are no longer able
to employ many of the tools they have historically used to mitigate that risk.50
2. Choosing Which Losses to Insure
The ACA also prohibits health insurance companies from managing their risk
by refusing to insure high-risk individuals: “each health insurance issuer that offers
health insurance coverage in the individual or group market in a State must accept
every employer and individual in the State that applies for such coverage.”51 Further,
the Act prohibits insurers from limiting their risk by refusing to insure preexisting
conditions: “A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or
44 Id.
45 § 2701(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iv), 124 Stat. at 155.
46 Id. § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(iv), 124 Stat. at 155.
47 Id. § 2705(a)(1)–(9), 124 Stat. at 156.
48 See Medical Underwriting, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary
/medical-underwriting/ [http://perma.cc/ZEJ4-LAAJ] (“A process used by insurance companies
to try to figure out your health status when you’re applying for health insurance coverage to
determine whether to offer you coverage, at what price, and with what exclusions or limits.”).
49 See BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 38, at 12 (“[A]dverse selection typically refers to the
(theoretical) tendency for high-risk people to be more interested in insurance than low-risk people
are. . . . The theoretical result of adverse selection is that the average risk level of people who
choose to purchase insurance will be higher than the average level of risk of the population
as a whole.”).
50 See generally id. at 8–9 (discussing premium differentials, deductibles and co-payments,
and exclusions and cancellations as ways in which insurance companies manage risk).
51 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2702(a), 124 Stat. 119, 156 (2010).
220 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:213
individual health insurance coverage may not impose any preexisting condition
exclusion with respect to such plan or coverage.”52
The ACA also requires that each individual and small-group plan sold contain
coverage for certain essential benefits.53 This “essential health benefits package”
includes coverage for “[a]mbulatory patient services;” “[e]mergency services;” “[h]os-
pitalization;” “[m]aternity and newborn care;” “[m]ental health and substance abuse
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment;” “[p]rescription drugs;”
“[r]ehabilitative and habilitative services and devices;” “[l]aboratory services;” “[p]re-
ventive and wellness services and chronic disease management;” and “[p]ediatric
services, including oral and vision care.”54
Under the ACA, all health insurance plans must now contain significant minimum
health benefits. Insurance plans can no longer provide exclusions for certain kinds
of care, such as mental health or substance abuse.55 This means that insurers cannot
unilaterally exclude these benefits, but it also means that individuals seeking lower-
cost health plans cannot purchase plans that exclude these benefits. As one critic of
the ACA pointed out, it also means that “[i]nsurers must provide benefits that their
insureds do not need (such as coverage for pregnancy for men) . . . . “56 The result
is essentially less choice in the health insurance marketplace.
Through its regulation of the health insurance product, the ACA has drastically
increased the minimum coverage a health insurer must offer. Under the ACA’s regula-
tions, neither individuals nor health insurers may decrease coverage amounts or benefits
in an effort to reduce premiums.57
3. Deciding How to Allocate Resources
Finally, in its most dramatic regulation of health insurance companies, the ACA
sets a minimum “Medical Loss Ratio.”58 The Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) as defined
by the ACA is the ratio of: (1) the combined total of the amount of premium revenue
spent on reimbursement for medical expenses provided to insured individuals and activ-
ities that “improve health care quality”59 to (2) the total amount of premiums collected,
excluding Federal and State taxes and other minor fees.60 The stated purpose of the
minimum MLR is to “ensure adequate participation by health insurance issuers,
competition in the health insurance market . . . , and value for consumers so that
premiums are used for clinical services and quality improvements.”61
52 Id. § 2704(a), 124 Stat. at 154.
53 Id. § 2707, 124 Stat. at 161.
54 Id. § 1302(b)(1)(A)–(J), 124 Stat. at 163–64.
55 See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
56 Kopps, supra note 37, at 610.
57 Id.; see § 1302(b)(1)(A)–(J), 124 Stat 119, at 163–64.
58 § 2718, 124 Stat. at 136–37, amended by § 10101, 124 Stat. at 885–87.
59 Id. § 10101, 124 Stat. at 885.
60 Id. § 10101, 124 Stat. at 886.
61 Id. § 10101, 124 Stat. at 887.
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Under the ACA, the MLR is set at 85% for large group business and 80% for small
group business.62 States have the power to set the MLRs higher than the federal
minimum,63 and the Secretary has the ability to adjust the percentage in each state
if the Secretary believes that the application of the federal standards will “destabilize
the individual market” in the state.64 Once the MLR for a state is set, whether at the
federal minimum or a state-specific ratio, if a company’s MLR is lower than what
is required—meaning that the company spends less than the approved percentage of its
premium dollars on paying claims and quality healthcare improvements—the company
must issue a rebate to its insureds for the difference.65 The effect of the rebate is to bring
the MLR back to the level required by reducing the amount of premium revenue.
The MLR is a complicated principle that merits explanation by example. A health
insurer receives $1,000 in premium revenues for one year and provides only small
group or individual coverage—no large group coverage. Under the federal standard,
(omitting, for simplicity, any payment of taxes and fees) the insurer will be required
to spend a minimum of $800 in reimbursement for medical expenses and “activities
that improve health care quality.”66 If the health insurer fails to meet this minimum
and only spends $700 on those things, then the insurer will have to rebate $100 to its
enrollees. If the health insurer provides only large group coverage, it will be required
to spend a minimum of $850, and will have to return $150 if it only spends $700.
The effect of the MLR and its rebate requirement is that health insurance
companies are now limited in the amount of revenue that can go towards administra-
tive costs and profits on a yearly basis. Furthermore, because the MLR is calculated
yearly, companies are not able to average their performance.67 For example, a health
insurer with only large group business that has an MLR of 90% (5% higher than the
85% required) one year, and an MLR of 80% the next (5% lower than required) will
not be able to average the two years, but will have to pay their enrollees a 5% rebate
in the second year. Critics of the plan point to this as one of its flaws—health in-
surance companies are not able to protect themselves for the “bad” years by having
“good” years; each year is evaluated on a stand-alone basis.68
Prior to the ACA’s passage, fifteen states had existing MLRs.69 The state MLRs
were defined differently,70 and all of them were lower than the minimums set by the
62 Id. § 10101, 124 Stat. at 886.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. § 10101, 124 Stat. at 886–87.
66 Id. § 10101, 124 Stat. at 885.
67 See Kopps, supra note 37, at 611.
68 See id. (“By not allowing insurance companies to keep extra profit in ‘good years’ to offset
deficits in ‘bad years,’ [the ACA] is essentially forcing insurance companies into bankruptcy.”).
69 Medical Loss Ratios for Health Insurance, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance-medical-loss-ratios.aspx [http://perma.cc/5UAK
-ZU23] [hereinafter Medical Loss Ratios for Health Insurance]. 
70 See Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 261; see also Stubblebine, supra note 37, at 377.
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ACA.71 Although state MLR ratios were lower than the ratio set by the ACA (the low-
est existing state MLR was North Dakota’s at 55 percent in the individual market),72
the way the ACA calculates its MLR is more favorable to health insurance companies.
State MLRs were generally a straight ratio of claims paid out versus premiums re-
ceived.73 The ACA’s MLR includes accounting for quality healthcare improvements
and fees for taxes, licensing, and regulatory issues.74 Perhaps because of the more
lenient ratios, or because they only existed in several states, there have been no pub-
lished challenges to the constitutionality of state MLRs.75
The federal MLR went into effect in 2011, and insurers have issued rebates twice
since then.76 In 2012, insurers rebated over $504 million to over 8.5 million Ameri-
cans.77 In 2013, that number had decreased to $332 million to 6.8 million Americans.78
The Department of Health and Human Services announced that the law is causing
more health insurance companies to enter the market, creating greater competition.79
So far, there have been no constitutional challenges to the federal MLR or reports
of it forcing insurers out of business.80
II. EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP
A. Why the Constitutionality of the MLR Is an Important Question
A lively, and sometimes nasty, discussion about the ACA’s constitutional and
statutory validity has been on going since before the legislation passed. This discus-
sion has centered on the constitutionality of the Act’s Individual Mandate,81 Medicaid
71 Medical Loss Ratios for Health Insurance, supra note 69.
72 Id.
73 See Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/explaining-health-care-reform
-medical-loss-ratio-mlr/ [http://perma.cc/5DQ9-N6XG].
74 See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text.
75 This is based on the Author’s research, including comprehensive searches of Westlaw
and Lexis.
76 See 2013 MLR Refunds by State, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www
.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/2013_MLR_Refunds_by_State.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N9WE-2NSE]; 2012 Total Rebates, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/2012-mlr-rebates
-by-state-and-market.pdf [http://perma.cc/B4UA-XNJE].
77 2012 Total Rebates, supra note 76.
78 2013 MLR Refunds by State, supra note 76.
79 See Robert Pear, Health Law is Fostering Competition, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/health/health-law-is-fostering-competition-ad
ministration-says.html?hp&r=0 [http://perma.cc/YP46-8AMK].
80 This is based on the Author’s research.
81 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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expansion,82 birth control requirement,83 and most recently, a system of subsidies.84
Much of this discussion focuses on how the ACA interferes with individual and
states’ rights.
The insurance industry is the single entity that will be the most effected by the
ACA, yet there has been relatively little discussion of the effect the ACA will have
on that industry. Additionally, there have been no legal challenges to the ACA based
on the effect it will have on the business of insurance. This is, however, an incredibly
important topic. The ACA depends on the insurance industry—the private insurance
industry—for its successful implementation. It regulates the industry heavily.85 Be-
cause of the important role the insurance industry plays in the ACA, it is important
to evaluate the ACA’s regulation of that industry.
Congress was not blind to the effect the ACA would have on the insurance indus-
try. It was aware of the risk that limits on underwriting and increases in benefits would
result in people staying out of the health insurance market until they needed cover-
age, thereby increasing the cost of health insurance for individuals who maintained
coverage and further incentivizing individuals to abstain from purchasing health
insurance.86 The individual mandate was designed to minimize the risk of adverse selec-
tion and enable the health insurers to maintain a broad risk pool that could support
the amount of claims the companies would be paying.87
[I]f there were no [individual mandate], many individuals would
wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By sig-
nificantly increasing health insurance coverage, the [individual
mandate], together with other provisions of this Act, will mini-
mize this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk
pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insur-
ance premiums. The requirement is essential to creating effective
health insurance markets in which improved health insurance
products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage
of pre-existing conditions can be sold.88
Although the ACA sought to balance the competing interests of the individual,
the states, and the health insurer, it remains controversial. Given the political climate,
82 See, e.g., id.
83 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
84 See, e.g., Jess Bravin & Louise Radnofsky, Supreme Court to Hear Case on Health-Care
Law Subsidies, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2014, 7:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme
-court-to-hear-case-on-health-law-subsidies-1415383458 [http://perma.cc/Q5B7-4DDV].
85 See supra Part I.
86 See generally Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 254.
87 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 243 (2010).
88 Id. (emphasis added).
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constitutional challenges to the ACA are not going to stop. House opponents of the
ACA have led fifty-four votes to overturn, defund, or limit the law.89 Challenges to
every conceivable aspect of the law continue to filter through the courts.90 Critics of
the law are clearly seeking to derail it in whatever way they can and will leave no stone
unturned.91 The constitutionality of the MLR will likely be challenged at some point
in the future.
B. Current State of the Discussion
The formidable Richard Epstein began the discussion of the MLR as an uncon-
stitutional taking in an article about the Reid Bill, a precursor to the ACA.92 The
Reid Bill included a more stringent MLR than the ACA—90% across the board, rather
than the ACA’s 85% and 80%.93 Epstein later wrote an article with practitioner Paula
Stannard attacking the ACA’s MLR on similar grounds.94 Epstein still leads the con-
versation, joined mainly by law students.95 Because the current scholarly debate
centers around Epstein’s initial challenge, however, it carries the shortcomings of
that initial argument.
The essence of Epstein and Stannard’s argument is this—through its extensive
regulations, the ACA converts the health insurance companies into de facto public
utilities.96 As such, the analysis that should be used to examine the constitutionality of
any rate-making in the legislation is the public utility rate-making analysis.97 Moreover,
because the health insurance companies existed pre-ACA in a competitive market,
any rate regulation is unnecessary because they already operate at the most efficient
level possible.98 Imposing more stringent rate requirements on health insurers will
result in a reduction in services and quality, if not bankrupt the companies entirely.99
89 O’Keefe, supra note 27.
90 See id.; see also Bravin & Radnofsky, supra note 84.
91 See O’Keefe, supra note 27.
92 Epstein, supra note 15.
93 See id. at 1–2.
94 See id.; see also Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16.
95 See supra Epstein, note 15; see also Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16; Kopps, supra note
37; Stubblebine, supra note 37; Wesley D. Markham, Healthcare Reform’s Mandatory Medical
Loss Ratio: Constitutionality, Policy, and Implementation, 46 U. S.F. L. REV. 139 (2011).
96 See Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 263 (“Indeed, there is only one feature of
the standard public utility that is not present: protection of constitutional rates of return.”).
97 Id. at 262–63.
98 Id. at 263.
99 Id. at 264 (“To be clear, the justification for the MLRs cannot be that firms do not
minimize administrative costs in order to maximize profits. They are doing that right now
with their current allocation of services, so that the additional limits on administrative costs
mean that certain important services, such as fraud prevention, are necessarily curtailed be-
cause of the want of the needed resources to combat them.”).
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This argument has several major shortcomings. First, its conclusion that the
ACA effectively converts health insurance companies into public utilities is incorrect.
Because this conclusion is flawed, Epstein and Stannard apply the incorrect constitu-
tional analysis to the MLR and draw conclusions about its constitutionality that are
not merited. As discussed more fully below, legislative rate-making of public utilities
merits a unique constitutional analysis because of the public utility’s status as a
monopoly.100 Absent the monopoly status and the accompanying inability of the
market to inform rate-making regulation, there is no good reason to apply anything
other than the standard applied to ordinary regulation of companies.
Additionally, Epstein and Stannard fail to consider the impact the MLR has on
the health insurers in light of the ACA as a whole. Pre-ACA, health insurers “ha[d]
the conventional incentive to maximize their profits, which in the standard scenario
means that they will only engage in certain expenditures to the point where the extra
dollar that is paid out brings an extra dollar in.”101 They argue that this means that
any additional regulation of the health insurance industry is unnecessary and ineffective,
at best.102 “If these provisions made sense, they would be in the policies or plans
already. But since they generally are not in all policies, we have to assume that each
of them is in some sense an economic loser.”103
Aside from the circularity of this argument—if the provisions made sense, they
would be there; because they are not there, they do not make sense—even if it is true
of parts of the ACA individually, the argument fails when considered in light of the
ACA as a whole. The ACA is a comprehensive overhaul of the healthcare system.104
It includes provisions regulating all aspects of the healthcare industry.105 Even if the
health insurance market had been functioning as best as possible before the ACA and
competition among health insurers had led companies to adopt the most efficient busi-
ness practices so as to maximize their profits, the ACA completely changed the market.
The MLR was not introduced as a lone piece of legislation into a perfectly function-
ing market. A discussion of the effect the MLR will have on the health insurance
companies can only be informative when done in light of the ACA as a whole.106
Additionally, in stating that the health insurance industry existed in a competi-
tive market that resulted in the highest levels of efficiency possible, Epstein and
Stannard failed to take into account the extensive system of state regulation in which
insurance companies have operated for decades.107 States have not only regulated the
100 See infra notes 266–69 and accompanying text.
101 Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 264.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 265.
104 See Harrington, supra note 30.
105 See supra Part I.
106 See infra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., 1 BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH 
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policies insurance companies can sell108 and imposed minimum medical loss ratios
on insurance companies,109 but they have regulated the rates companies can charge110
and the ways in which companies can underwrite.111 Epstein and Stannard’s conclusion
that insurance companies do not need regulation because they have been operating
just fine without it is just factually inaccurate.
Finally, their argument that insurance companies do not need regulation because
they have “the conventional incentive to maximize their profits”112 does not take into
account the effect on the consumer. In making this statement, they seem to be assuming
that consumers have perfect (or at least very good) information and would not pay
a lower price for a product that is not as good because the consumer would know
that the product is not as good. However, insurance practices and policies are extremely
complicated, and many people who have insurance do not understand their policies.113
In a recent study, a healthcare economist gave 202 people who had employer-sponsored
health insurance a multiple-choice quiz testing their understanding of four basic health
insurance terms.114 A shocking 14% of participants got all four answers correct.115
Clearly, healthcare consumers do not have the amount of knowledge and informa-
tion required to ensure that the system works effectively and that health insurance
INSURANCE § 1.02 (“The business of insurance, its companies, its products, and its people are
heavily regulated, especially in those states with large urban and commercial concentrations.”).
108 See, e.g., id. § 1.02(3)(b) (“Almost all states, in one way or another, have requirements
for the official filing or approval of insurance policy forms. Under the most strict regulatory
pattern, a policy must be filed, and it is not usable until approved.”).
109 See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 107, at § 1.02(3) (“In certain cases [the role
of state regulation] also includes fairness of rates and equality of insuring opportunities.
While state regulation to some extent limits what insurers can do, under what is known as
‘the filed rate rule’ or ‘filed rate doctrine,’ regulatory approval of rates and policy forms can
protect insurers from attempts to judicially enforce statutory requirements of reasonability.”).
111 See, e.g., id. § 3.01(7) (“Legislative limitations on risk selection in life and health insurance
are familiar, but, until recently, have been of limited scope. Traditionally, these limitations
have been motivated by considerations of fairness—as in the long standing [sic] prohibition
in some states on racially discriminatory underwriting—and social policy, as in limitations on
underwriting based on . . . blindness, exposure to DES and sexual orientation. . . . In the 1990s
however, such legislative limitations on underwriting have undergone an explosive growth.”).
112 Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 264.
113 See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Do You Understand Health Insurance? Most People Don’t.,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog
/wp/2013/08/08/do-you-understand-health-insurance-most-people-dont/ [http://perma.cc/ESF3
-9LPR] (quoting a healthcare economist: “I have a PhD in economics and I’ve spent a bunch
of time giving insurance companies feedback about policies, and I still find them difficult
to understand”).
114 George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32 J.
HEALTH ECON. 850, 853 (2013). The quiz tested subjects’ understanding of: (1) out-of-
pocket maximum; (2) coinsurance; (3) co-pay; and (4) deductible. Id.
115 Id. at 855.
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companies are not only maximizing profits but are giving consumers the best value
for their dollar. This is one of the major goals of the MLR.116
Subsequent discussions of the MLR’s constitutionality have many of the same
shortcomings as Epstein’s and Stannard’s analysis.117 To some extent, each incor-
rectly applies the public utility rate-making analysis to examine the MLR as a taking,
fails to fully develop the constitutional analysis, and fails to examine the effect the MLR
will have on the insurance industry in light of the ACA as a whole.
The fundamental shortcoming in the existing scholarly work on the MLR is that
it uses the wrong constitutional standard to analyze the constitutionality of the provi-
sion. As discussed below, the proper constitutional standard is the regulatory takings
analysis governed by Penn Central.118 Under this standard, the MLR does not rise to
the level of a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.119
Although the MLR is not as widely criticized as other aspects of the ACA, it has
been subject to increasing scrutiny on constitutional grounds.120 The recent criticism
is that the MLR “deprive[s] firms of a sensible rate of return”121 and thus “rises to
the level of an unconstitutional taking of property under the Fifth Amendment.”122
This argument inappropriately applies the public utility rate-making analysis to in-
surance companies.
The appropriate standard for a constitutional challenge of the MLR as a violation
of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the analysis applied in regulatory
takings of private property. This standard is commonly referred to as the Penn
Central123 test and involves weighing a regulation’s economic impact, its interfer-
ence with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the gov-
ernmental action.124
116 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124 Stat. 119, 136–37 (2010), amended by
§ 10101, 124 Stat. 119, 886 (2010). The section setting forth the minimum medical loss ratios
is entitled “Ensuring that Consumers Receive Value for Their Premium Payments.” Id.
117 See Kopps, supra note 37; Markham, supra note 95.
118 See infra Part III.B.1.
119 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
120 See, e.g., Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16; Kopps, supra note 37.
121 Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 264.
122 Kopps, supra note 37, at 608.
123 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
124 Id. at 124.
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This Part outlines the two different constitutional analyses. It argues that the
analysis applied in the public utilities context is not appropriate for the MLR because
public utilities’ unique status as monopolies justifies the use of a distinct constitutional
analysis. Health insurance companies are neither monopolies nor public utilities,
thus the Penn Central regulatory takings analysis should be applied to determine if
the MLR is an unconstitutional taking.
A. Public Utility Rate-Making Analysis
There is an established body of federal law analyzing the constitutionality of
government rate regulation in the context of public utilities. Generally, rate regulation
is unconstitutional “if the government sets the utility’s charges . . . at a level that is
judicially determined to be unjust and confiscatory.”125 Thus, public utility rate regu-
lations do not constitute a taking of property unless the rate of return is so low that
it is considered “confiscatory.”126 The body of federal law examining rate regulation as
a taking of property is largely concerned with defining “confiscatory.”127
The modern standard governing the issue of unconstitutionally confiscatory rate-
making by a public utility is largely governed by Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch.128 In
Duquesne, the Duquesne Light Company challenged a Pennsylvania law prohibiting
electric utilities from including in their rates the cost of construction of a facility
until that facility was being used “in service to the public.”129 Duquesne sought to
increase its rates in order to amortize in excess of $34 million it had spent in the
construction of nuclear power plants after abandoning the project.130 The Court ruled
that utility rate regulation does not constitute a taking of property when the company
is still allowed a “reasonable rate of return on equity given the risks.”131
The main thrust of the decision in Duquesne was that rate regulation of public util-
ities only becomes unconstitutional when the rate becomes “unjust” or “unreasonable,”
and when it fails to give investors “a fair rate of return given the risks.”132
No argument has been made that these slightly reduced rates jeop-
ardize the financial integrity of the companies, either by leaving
them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their ability
125 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 15.12(b)(viii), at 1010–11 (5th ed. 2012).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1011.
128 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
129 Id. at 302.
130 Id. The Court and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission determined that Duquesne
“could not be faulted for initiating the construction” and that the investment was, at the time
it was made, prudent. Id. at 302–03.
131 Id. at 315.
132 Id. at 310.
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to raise future capital. Nor has it been demonstrated that these
rates are inadequate to compensate current equity holders for the
risk associated with their investments under a modified prudent
investment scheme.133
The standard for constitutional analysis outlined in Duquesne is a result-oriented
one.134 Regardless of the methodology or the reasoning behind the rate-setting
system, rates will not be considered unconstitutional unless the result of the rate is
to deprive the utility of a “fair rate of return given the risks.”135
While Duquesne established that there is no constitutionally mandated method-
ology for setting rates so long as the rates do not end up being unjust or unreasonable,
other Supreme Court decisions have established constitutionally permitted methods
for setting rates. The early standard for rate-setting was known as the “fair value”
rule.136 The fair value standard balanced the company’s right to “a fair return upon
the value of that which it employs for the public convenience” with the public’s right
to pay no more “than the services rendered by [the utility] are reasonably worth.”137
The fair value standard involved setting rates at the level they would be if the
utility were operating within the competitive market.138 The utility retains some of
the risk of their investment failing because if the facilities or services never turn out
to be useful to the public (and thus employ nothing for the public convenience), the
investments do not justify exacting any return from the public.139 However, if the in-
vestment is a good one, and the services are used by the public, the utility is entitled
to a “fair return” on that investment.140
While good in theory, the fair value standard proved difficult in practice.141 One
of the main problems was “the laborious and baffling task of finding the present
value of the utility.”142 Finding the fair market value of a commodity that, by def-
inition, existed outside of a fair market consistently presented difficulties for the
Court.143 Under the fair value rule, the Court admitted that at times, its calculations
were “speculative.”144
133 Id. at 312.
134 Id. at 310.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 308.
137 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898).
138 Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308.
139 Smyth, 169 U.S. at 547.
140 Id.; see also Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308–09.
141 Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 309; see also Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 292–94 (1923) [hereinafter Southwestern Bell] (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
142 Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 292 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
143 See id. at 292–94.
144 Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 225 U.S. 430, 436 (1914).
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After decrying the fair value rule as too difficult to implement, Justice Brandeis
proposed an alternative method for evaluating public utility rates.145 Brandeis con-
cluded that the “taking” in public utility regulation was not the taking of the physical
property or the facilities, but the capital that was invested in the enterprise.146 Thus,
the appropriate method for setting rates is to ensure that the utility is compensated
for all prudent investments at the actual cost of the investments when made, whether
or not they turn out to be of use to the public.147 Because the utilities carry less of the
risk, they are limited to a standard rate of return, but their return is based on all
money prudently invested, not just money that ends up being used for services for
the public good.148
The Court adopted this method as a constitutionally permissible one in Federal
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.149 In Hope, the Court held that “historical
cost” (the cost of a utility’s prudent investments in its operations) were a valid way
of calculating compensation.150 “Rates which enable the company to operate suc-
cessfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its
investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though
they might produce only a meager return on the so-called ‘fair value’ rate base.”151
The Court declined to find the rates unconstitutional based solely on the theory from
which they were calculated, and emphasized that the result is what makes a rate con-
stitutional or not.152 “[I]t is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts.
If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable,
judicial inquiry . . . is at an end.”153
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that, in analyzing the constitu-
tionality of public utility rates, what matters is the resulting rate, not the methodology
or theory that led to the rate.154 Moreover, a rate only violates the Constitution if it
is so unjust as to be confiscatory.155
There is a common thread running through the rate-making doctrine that strains
the constitutional analysis when it is applied outside the context of a public utility.
A public utility is “[a] company that provides necessary services to the public, such
145 Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 290–91 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
146 Id. at 291.
147 Id. at 302–10.
148 Id.
149 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
150 Id. at 605.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 602.
153 Id.
154 See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308–09 (1989); Southwestern Bell,
262 U.S. 276, 292–94 (1923).
155 See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391–92 (1974) (“All that
is protected against, in the constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be
higher than a confiscatory level.”).
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as telephone lines and service, electricity, and water. Most utilities operate as mo-
nopolies but are subject to governmental regulation.”156 In Duquesne, the Court
clarified an element of the “reasonable rate” calculation.157 “The risks a utility faces
are in large part defined by the rate methodology because utilities are virtually always
public monopolies dealing in an essential service, and so relatively immune to the
usual market risks.”158 If the “risk” part of the “fair rate of return given the risks”
standard is concerned solely—or even almost solely—with risks regarding regula-
tion itself, then that standard is inapplicable outside the public utility context. A
company that operates in a highly competitive industry—like the health insurance
industry—faces completely different risks than one that operates as a protected
monopoly. Therefore, a constitutional analysis that is designed to take into account
risks specific to a public utility cannot appropriately be applied to a company that
faces a different set of risks.159
Moreover, the constitutional analysis the Court applies in the public utility rate-
making context evolved from a standard designed to set rates at what they would be
if the utility operated within a competitive market.160 This, too, is inapplicable outside
the public utility context. When a company is operating within a competitive market,
the market functions to set the rates at a competitive level.161 Because the rate-
making context is completely different, the constitutional analysis should be as well.
B. Regulatory Takings Analysis
The paradigmatic taking is when the government enters a person’s private
property and appropriates the property for government use.162 Because a regulatory
taking will never look exactly like the paradigmatic taking, the purpose of the regu-
latory taking analysis is to identify situations that are comparable to a direct ouster
or appropriation.163 Thus, the focus of the analysis is on the burden imposed on the
private property.164
Two kinds of regulatory takings constitute per se takings: (1) when the govern-
ment allows a permanent physical occupation of property, and (2) when a regulation
completely deprives an owner of all economically beneficial uses of her property.165
156 Public Utility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
157 Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314–15.
158 Id. at 315.
159 The differences between public utilities and health insurance companies are more fully
discussed infra Part IV.A.
160 See supra notes 136–48 and accompanying text.
161 See Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 262.
162 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
163 Id. at 542.
164 Id. at 543.
165 Id. at 538.
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Aside from those narrow and very rarely occurring circumstances,166 the inquiry is
based on the Penn Central analysis and is ad hoc and fact-intensive.167 The party at-
tempting to establish a taking bears a heavy burden of proof, and courts generally
defer to the regulation.168
1. Penn Central Analysis
Aside from the two narrow per se takings exceptions, regulatory takings are
analyzed based on the Penn Central standard.169 The Penn Central analysis “is charac-
terized by essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries designed to allow careful examination
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.”170
Penn Central involved a challenge by Penn Central Transportation Company, the
owners of New York City’s Grand Central Terminal, to New York City’s Landmarks
Preservation Law.171 Penn Central sought to lease the air rights above the terminal
to a company that would construct a fifty-five-story office building.172 The terminal
had been designated a landmark under the Landmarks Preservation Law, and when
Penn Central applied for permission to construct the addition, permission was denied.173
Penn Central then filed suit, claiming that the application of the Landmarks Law un-
constitutionally deprived them of their property without just compensation.174
The Court held that the prohibition did not constitute an unconstitutional taking
of property under the Fifth Amendment.175 The Court assessed the “severity of the
impact of the law on [Penn Central’s] parcel,”176 and concluded that the law did not
interfere with Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of its land be-
cause they could “continue to use the property precisely as it had been used for the
166 These circumstances are both incredibly rare and not applicable to the MLR; thus, although
part of the regulatory takings doctrine, they will not be discussed or examined at length.
167 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39; see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522–23 (1998).
168 See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 528; Concrete Pipe
& Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
169 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39.
170 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002)
(citations omitted).
171 438 U.S. at 107.
172 Id. at 116.
173 Id. at 116–18.
174 Id. at 119. The lease agreement that Penn Central had negotiated involved payment of
$1 million annually during construction of the addition and a minimum of $3 million annually
thereafter. Id. at 116. This was in 1968. Id. Adjusted for only inflation—not taking into account
the rising property values in New York City—the amount of money that the prohibition on
construction cost Penn Central annually was $6,802,758.62 and $20,408,275.86, respectively.
CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc
.pl?cost1=3%2C000%2C000.00&year1=1968&year2=2014 [http://perma.cc/TU7A-MZF7]
(input “1,000,000” or “3,000,000” for “$” and “1968” for “in”).
175 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
176 Id. at 136.
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past 65 years.”177 Additionally, the Court held that Penn Central had not shown that
the law effectively abrogated its rights to use the airspace above the terminal be-
cause “nothing the Commission has said or done suggests an intention to prohibit
any construction above the Terminal.”178 Further, Penn Central had not been denied
all use of the air rights because Penn Central could transfer the rights, and although
that transfer might not constitute “‘just compensation’ if a ‘taking’ had occurred, the
rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has
imposed.”179 Because “[t]he restrictions imposed are substantially related to the pro-
motion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the
landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the
Terminal site proper but also other properties,” the regulation did not constitute a
taking of property.180
The Penn Central analysis begins with the assertion that the Fifth Amendment
is “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”181 The
Court acknowledges the absence of a “set formula” for evaluating when “justice and
fairness” require that a taking be found, but goes on to identify “several factors that
have particular significance” in the inquiry.182 These have come to be known as the
“Penn Central factors.”183 These factors are: (1) the economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant; (2) the regulation’s interference with the claimant’s distinct,
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.184
The three prongs of the Penn Central test all need to be considered, and no one
of them is dispositive.185 The claimant must prove that the economic impact of the
regulation is severe, that the regulation interferes substantially with the claimant’s
distinct investment-backed expectations, and that the character of the governmental
action is similar to that of a paradigmatic taking.186 Because the Court has articulated
that the goal of a regulatory takings analysis is to identify regulations that are function-
ally equivalent to the paradigmatic taking in which the government appropriates
private property for its own purpose,187 in evaluating each of these factors, the focus
is on “the severity of the burden that government imposes on private property rights.”188
177 Id.
178 Id. at 137.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 138.
181 Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
182 Id. at 124.
183 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
320 (2002).
184 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
185 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 539.
188 Id.
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If, when considered as a whole, the combined impact of all three prongs makes the gov-
ernmental action look like the paradigmatic taking, then the Court will find a taking.189
a. The Economic Impact of the Regulation
The first prong of the Penn Central analysis focuses on the “economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant.”190 The Court further defines this analysis as “the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.”191 The focus
is on the “parcel as a whole,” rather than on specific parts of an owner’s property that
are effected by a regulation.192 This precludes a claimant from defining his property
right narrowly so that the economic impact appears to be larger than it is.193
Another consequence of focusing on the parcel as a whole in the regulatory tak-
ings analysis is that it carries with it an implicit requirement that the claimant must
establish a property interest in order to establish a taking.194 Thus, regardless of the
extent to which a regulation economically impacts a claimant, if the regulation does
not interfere with a “legitimate property interest[ ],”195 it is not a taking for Fifth
Amendment purposes.196 The “legitimate property interest” requirement of the Penn
Central analysis will be discussed in more detail later.197
189 Id. at 539–40.
190 Id. at 538 (citations omitted).
191 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978). See also Stephen J. Eagle, “Economic
Impact” in Regulatory Takings Law, 19 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 407,
413–14 (2013).
192 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31.
193 Eagle, supra note 191, at 413–14; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31 (holding
that a regulation’s economic impact must be examined for its effect on the “parcel as a whole,”
not discrete segments thereof).
194 See Eagle, supra note 191, at 415 (explaining that the Federal Circuit applies the Penn
Central analysis in two steps: (1) determining whether the claimant has established a property
interest, and (2) determining whether the governmental action at issue amounted to a taking
of that property interest).
195 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2002).
196 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 543–44 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (“[The regulation] neither targets a specific property interest
nor depends upon any particular property for the operation of its statutory mechanisms. The
liability imposed on Eastern no doubt will reduce its net worth and its total value, but this can be
said of any law which has an adverse economic effect. . . . [T]he Government’s imposition
of an obligation between private parties, or destruction of an existing obligation, must relate to
a specific property interest to implicate the Takings Clause.”); id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“This case involves not an interest in physical or intellectual property, but an ordinary
liability to pay money, and not to the Government, but to third parties. This Court has not
directly held that the Takings Clause applies to the creation of this kind of liability.”); see
also United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) (“[N]ot all economic interests
are ‘property rights’; only those economic advantages are ‘rights’ which have the law back
of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear from
interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion.”).
197 See infra notes 271–76 and accompanying text.
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The Penn Central Court put forth several general standards for evaluating the
economic impact of a regulation.198 The analysis involves determining whether the
regulation has “an unduly harsh impact upon the owner’s use of the property,”199
whether the claimant can obtain “a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment,”200 and
whether the property remains “economically viable.”201
The promulgation of so many different standards to use in evaluating just one
prong of the Court’s test highlights the lack of bright line rules and the incredibly
fact-specific nature of the inquiry. In applying these nebulous standards, the Court is
highly deferential to government regulation.202 In order to establish an economic
impact so severe that it constitutes a taking, a claimant must essentially show a com-
plete deprivation of economic interest.203 “[M]ere diminution in the value of prop-
erty, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.”204
b. The Interference with Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
Since its first regulatory takings analysis after Penn Central, the Court has treated
the interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations as the second prong
of the Penn Central analysis.205 There is, however, a body of scholarship that asserts
that Penn Central itself combined this prong with the first prong and only put forth
a two-prong test.206 Moreover, that scholarship points out the shift in language from
Penn Central’s “distinct investment-backed expectations”207 to “reasonable invest-
ment backed expectations.”208 Regardless of which interpretation is true to the Penn
Central Court’s original intent, the Court now consistently applies the “interference
with reasonable investment backed expectation[ ]” as the second prong of the Penn
Central analysis.209
198 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
199 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
200 Id. at 136.
201 Id. at 138 n.36.
202 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993).
203 See id. (citing cases in which no taking was found when there was a 75% diminution
in value, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926), or a 92.5%
diminution in value, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 294, 405 (1915)).
204 Id.
205 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
206 See, e.g., Eagle, supra note 191, at 415 & n.49.
207 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (emphasis added).
208 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Eagle, supra note 191, at
433–34.
209 See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523 (1998); Concrete Pipe & Prods. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 212 (1986).
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Interpreting this prong as an extension of the first prong, however, does help to
explain some of the Court’s analytical behavior. In discussing a regulation’s eco-
nomic impact (the first prong), the Court often discusses the extent to which the
impact is proportional to the claimant’s past experiences with previous legislation.210
Proportional impact, however, seems like it would be a more appropriate analysis
under the second prong of the test. Additionally, much of the analysis of the second
prong is similar to the analysis under the first prong.211
One distinct difference in the analysis, however, is that under the second prong,
the Court focuses more on what the claimant reasonably expected as it relates to
regulations.212 This prong of the analysis focuses on whether an unanticipated change
in regulations would “erode economic viability of the investment in the whole prop-
erty after imposition.”213
The focus on reasonable—rather than distinct—investment-backed expectations
“had the effect of converting landowners’ informed judgments about future possibil-
ities into a reasonable notice of rules inquiry.”214 Thus, under the second prong, the
focus is on whether a claimant would reasonably expect that she would be faced with
the burden imposed by the regulation.215 In evaluating whether a claimant would
reasonably expect the burden imposed by the regulation, past regulation, although
not dispositive, is a major factor.216
The second prong of the Penn Central test has evolved into what is essentially
an inquiry into reasonable notice of future regulation.217 The Court is very reluctant
to find interference in this area when a claimant has previously been subjected to
extensive regulation of the same kind.218 However, even when a claimant has been
210 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 530; Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 645; Connolly,
475 U.S. at 224.
211 See, e.g., E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 532 (“For similar reasons [to the reasons for economic
impact], the Coal Act substantially interferes with Eastern’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations.”).
212 See, e.g., id. at 532–36 (holding that the retroactivity of the regulation at issue raised
“substantial questions of fairness” because it deprived the claimant of its expectations and
imposed an unexpected burden on the claimant).
213 William W. Wade, Sources of Regulatory Takings Economics Confusion Subsequent
to Penn Central, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,936, 10,938 (2011).
214 Eagle, supra note 191, at 433 (citing Wade, supra note 213, at 10,938).
215 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 536 (“Nor would the pattern of the Federal Government’s
involvement in the coal industry have given Eastern ‘sufficient notice’ that [liability would
be imposed].”); Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 646 (“[I]t could have had no reasonable
expectation that it would not be faced with liability for promised benefits.”); Connolly, 475
U.S. at 227 (“Prudent employers then had more than sufficient notice not only that pension
plans were currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional finan-
cial obligations.”).
216 See, e.g., Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227.
217 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 645–47.
218 See, e.g., id.
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subject to prior regulation, if the regulation at issue is significantly different from past
regulation, the Court will find that it interferes with the claimant’s expectations.219
c. The Character of the Governmental Action
The final prong of the Penn Central test is in some ways the most straightforward.
The Court clarified the nature of this inquiry: “A ‘taking’ may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”220 Thus, the
inquiry into the character of the governmental action can be described as an inquiry
into how similar the governmental action is to the paradigmatic taking in which the
government enters private property and appropriates it for its own use.
Penn Central recognized several classes of cases in which the character of the
governmental action would not constitute a taking for Fifth Amendment purposes:
when the regulation promotes public “health, safety, morals, or general welfare;”221
when the regulation makes “a choice between the preservation of one class of prop-
erty and that of the other;”222 when the regulation concludes that a specific use of
property is “inconsistent with neighboring uses;”223 and when the regulation “sub-
stantially furthers important public policies.”224 However, when regulations are merely
“acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions,”225 the
character of the governmental action often can constitute a taking.
In applying this prong, the Court has stayed relatively true to its original analysis.
It has refused to find a taking under this prong when the regulation merely adjusted
economic benefits and burdens to promote the common good.226 The Court further
explained a limitation on challenges to Government regulation:
In the course of regulating commercial and other human affairs,
Congress routinely creates burdens for some that directly benefit
others. . . . Given the propriety of the governmental power to
regulate, it cannot be said that the Takings Clause is violated
whenever legislation requires one person to use his or her assets
for the benefit of another.227
219 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (“Retroactive legislation
presents problems of unfairness . . . because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations
and upset settled transactions.”).
220 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citations omitted).
221 Id. at 125.
222 Id. at 126.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 127.
225 Id. at 128.
226 Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
227 Id. at 223.
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The final prong of the Penn Central analysis remains essentially focused on deter-
mining how similar the governmental action is to the paradigmatic taking.
Unless a claimant can prove that a regulation constitutes a permanent physical
occupation of her property or that it deprives her of all economically beneficial uses
of her property, both of which are extraordinary circumstances, then a regulatory
takings claim will be analyzed under the Penn Central framework. An ad hoc and
fact-intensive inquiry, the Penn Central analysis examines the economic impact on
the claimant, the interference with the claimant’s reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations, and the character of the governmental action to determine if the regulation
constitutes a taking of the claimant’s property. The purpose of this analysis is to identify
situations that are similar to a government ouster or appropriation, but a regulation
that simply adjusts the burdens and benefits of economic life will rarely constitute
a regulatory taking.
IV. TAKINGS ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE MLR
A. The Public Utilities Takings Analysis Should Not Be Applied to the MLR
A public utility is a company that (1) provides a necessary public service; (2) is
subject to extensive government regulation; and (3) operates as a monopoly.228 More
specifically, a public utility is: “a vertically integrated company, government-selected,
providing prescribed services within a defined territory at approved prices.”229 Further,
public utilities are supported by a “legal infrastructure, called a franchise.”230 The
legal infrastructure has seven distinct dimensions, all of which are designed to align
the utility’s interest with the public interest.231 This Note will discuss four of these
seven dimensions: (1) exclusive retail franchise (monopoly power described as the
“right to be the sole provider of a government-prescribed service within a state-
defined service territory”);232 (2) obligation to serve; (3) consent to regulation; and
(4) quality of service.233
1. Exclusive Retail Franchise
Public utilities almost always have monopoly status that is granted and maintained
by statute. Although the extent of a utility’s monopoly power varies based on the
228 Public Utility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
229 SCOTT HEMPLING, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE: THE LAW OF MARKET




233 Id. at 14–15. Only the four dimensions that apply to health insurance companies will
be discussed in this Note.
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statute, when states grant exclusive franchises to public utilities, they prohibit competi-
tion within a specific geographic area, and appoint a company to be the sole provider
of services in that area.234
In contrast, health insurance companies operate in a highly competitive market.
With health insurance companies, “[t]here are no territorial or product monopolies.
There is cut-throat competition among large and sophisticated suppliers who deal with
sophisticated employers who know that if they do not supply decent coverage to their
employees, they risk the loss of their services.”235 Further, a goal of the ACA is to bring
more health insurance companies into the market to increase competition, thereby
increasing quality and service.236 This is also a goal of the MLR specifically—to
“incentivize insurance companies to reduce administrative costs and premiums.”237
Lower premiums lead to more competition among health insurers because price ceases
to be as much a factor in determining which company to use, and companies thus have
to compete more in the areas of customer service and product quality.
A justification commonly given for the protected monopoly status of public
utilities is economic efficiency.238 Many public utilities are “natural monopolies.”
A natural monopoly is a function of “the relationship between demand and the
technology of supply. If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at
lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly,
whatever the actual number of firms in it.”239 Additionally, the nature of the product
and services public utilities provide lends itself to monopoly status. The Supreme
Court noted that allowing competition among public utility companies could result
in disruptions in the daily life of society:
[B]y the time natural gas became a widely marketable commodity,
the States had learned from chastening experience that public
streets could not be continually torn up to lay competitors’ pipes,
that investments in parallel delivery systems for different fractions
of a local market would limit the value to consumers of any price
competition, and that competition would simply give over to mo-
nopoly in due course. It seemed virtually an economic necessity
for States to provide a single, local franchise with a business op-
portunity free of competition from any source, within or without
the State, so long as the creation of exclusive franchises under state
234 HEMPLING, supra note 229, at 15.
235 Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 262.
236 Stubblebine, supra note 37, at 361, 376.
237 Id.
238 See generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly & Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 548 (1969).
239 Id. at 548.
240 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:213
law could be balanced by regulation and the imposition of obliga-
tions to the consuming public upon the franchised retailers.240
None of these considerations apply to health insurance companies. While it is
possible that one health insurance company could meet the needs of the entire market
at the lowest cost, the fact that so many health insurance companies are in the market
suggests that a single, monopoly provider would either not meet the needs of the market
adequately or do so at the lowest cost.241 Additionally, establishing new health in-
surance companies does not require that “public streets . . . be continually torn up,”242
or that individuals’ daily lives be otherwise disrupted. A health insurance company en-
ters the market just like any other business does—by renting or buying office space,
hiring personnel, filing the necessary paperwork, and jumping through the required
regulatory hoops.243 Health insurance companies are neither natural monopolies nor
the sorts of companies for which monopoly protection is beneficial to the public.
2. Obligation to Serve
As a condition of the monopoly power that many states grant public utilities, they
also often give them an “obligation to serve,” meaning that public utilities must take
all comers.244
Virginia’s statute is clear on the requirement of obligation to serve: “It shall be
the duty of every public utility to furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities at
reasonable and just rates to any person, firm or corporation along its lines desiring
same.”245 The statute also expressly states that utilities may not discriminate in the
rates they charge: “It shall be the duty of every public utility to charge uniformly
therefor all persons, corporations or municipal corporations using such service under
like conditions.”246
This characteristic of public utilities arguably applies to health insurance companies
under the ACA. By prohibiting health insurance companies from denying coverage
240 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 289–90 (1997).
241 As of 2013, there were 359,907 direct health insurance carriers in the country. State Insur-
ance Regulation: Key Facts and Market Trends, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS (Aug. 19,
2014), http://www.naic.org/state_report_cards/report_card_wa.pdf [http://perma.cc/9LTY
-ZGDE]. That number rose from 331,547 in 2011, an increase of 28,360 companies, or
almost 8% of the existing market. Id.
242 Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 290.
243 See, e.g., Kay Miranda, How to Start an Independent Insurance Company, HOUSTON
CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/start-independent-insurance-company-2306.html
[http://perma.cc/PCA3-5RG3] (discussing the steps to establish a new insurance company).
244 HEMPLING, supra note 229, at 14.
245 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234 (2011).
246 Id.
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to individuals,247 the ACA essentially requires that the companies take all comers.
Similarly, by severely limiting the amount of underwriting health insurance companies
can do,248 the ACA essentially requires that the companies charge a (somewhat)
uniform price to every person. However, this characteristic of public utilities alone does
not justify the use of a separate constitutional takings analysis. It is all the qualities of
public utilities taken together that grants them a unique position in the market and
unique constitutional protection.
3. Consent to Regulation
When public utilities accept the grant of exclusive retail franchise and the
obligation to serve, they also consent to existing and subsequent regulation.249 This
principle is over one hundred years old and began with Munn v. Illinois.250 In Munn,
owners of grain elevators and warehouses challenged an Illinois statute that capped
the prices they could charge, claiming that the profit cap was an unconstitutional taking
of their property.251 The Supreme Court rejected that argument in part because the
businesses were involved in an enterprise which affected the public252:
When . . . one devotes his property to a use in which the public
has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that
use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the com-
mon good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. . . . [S]o
long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control.253
Even though the statute capped the prices the grain elevators and warehouses could
charge—and thus their profits—the Court did not find it unconstitutional because
the businesses had essentially consented to regulation by engaging in a business that
affected the public interest.254
This attribute of public utilities—that they are engaged in a business that affects
the public interest—also arguably applies to health insurance companies. The ACA
was enacted in part because of the virtual necessity of wide access to health insur-
ance coverage.255 Further, even if health insurance companies did not provide a
247 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (discussing the factors insurance com-
panies may consider).
248 See supra notes 41–51 and accompanying text.
249 See HEMPLING, supra note 229, at 15.
250 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
251 Id. at 123.
252 Id. at 126.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 See Stubblebine, supra note 37, at 343 (discussing the purposes of the ACA).
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service that was necessary, their service certainly affects the public interest. Addition-
ally, even if a distinction did exist between public and private companies that sub-
jected the former but not the latter to regulation, the Supreme Court did away with
that distinction in Nebbia v. New York,256 in which it held that all economic actors
are subject to regulation.257 Because “there is no closed class or category of businesses
affected with a public interest,”258 Nebbia established that it was no longer only public
utilities that were subject to economic regulation.259 Moreover, “[t]he Constitution
does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to inflict
injury upon the public at large, or upon any substantial group of the people.”260
Although this attribute of public utilities also applies to the health insurance
industry, Nebbia established that it applies to all businesses because all businesses
in some ways affect the public interest.261 Thus, the presence of this characteristic
in the health insurance industry does not justify applying the constitutional analysis
that has been developed for public utilities.
4. Quality of Service
Public utilities are subject to regulation requiring them to maintain a certain
quality of service. Legislatures have recognized that the grant of an exclusive retail
franchise might distort incentives for public utilities.262 Public utilities have no com-
petition, rates that are set by statute, and statutorily guaranteed rates of return. Thus,
there is little inherent incentive for public utilities to maintain a quality product or
service. Therefore, many legislatures regulate the quality of service that a public utility
must provide.263 The New York statute provides that the Commission may order public
utilities to make “such reasonable improvements as will best promote the public
interest, preserve the public health and protect those using” the utility’s services.264
This aspect of public utilities does not apply to health insurance companies. Al-
though the ACA requires health insurance companies to make certain information
public about their quality and performance,265 it does not grant the government any
power to order them to make changes in the service or product they provide. If an
256 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
257 Id. at 531.
258 Id. at 536.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 538–39.
261 Id. at 536.
262 HEMPLING, supra note 229, at 44–45.
263 Id.
264 N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(2) (2013).
265 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124 Stat. 119, 136–37 (2010), amended by § 10101,
124 Stat. 119, 885–87 (2010) (requiring health insurance companies to report their yearly MLRs
so consumers will be able to evaluate the efficiency of each health insurance company).
2015] ADJUSTING THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF ECONOMIC LIFE 243
insurance company continually provides poor quality service, the intense competition
in the market will correct that problem—consumers will stop purchasing the product,
and the health insurance company will either go out of business or improve the quality
of its product. Because health insurance companies do not have monopoly status, there
is no need for the legislature to require that they comply with a specific level of quality
of service—the market can be trusted to correct any deficiencies in quality.
Although public utilities have many unique attributes, it is mainly their monop-
oly status that makes it reasonable to apply a separate constitutional analysis to rate-
making in that context. Public utilities, as monopolies, essentially operate outside
the free market.266 This means that there is no way to really know what the optimal
rates are in monopolies because the lack of competition eliminates the “delicate bal-
ancing act whereby [the firm] must ask whether the additional services that it could
supply will generate revenues equal to, or greater than, its costs of providing those
services.”267 Because this balancing does not naturally occur, the only way to set
prices while ensuring that the service remains is by reference to profit. This is why
the public utility analysis is focused on ensuring that the company recovers a “fair
rate of return given the risks.”268
Health insurance companies, however, operate in a highly competitive market.
There is no need to define rates with reference to profits because the marketplace
defines which rates are reasonable and which are not. Because the reasons behind
the separate constitutional analysis for public utilities are not present in the context
of the ACA, it should be examined under the general regulatory takings doctrine
governed by Penn Central.269
B. Under the Penn Central Analysis, the MLR Does Not Constitute a Taking
Under the Penn Central analysis, the MLR does not constitute a taking of
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In order to establish a taking, a health
266 See 54A AM. JUR. 2D MONOPOLIES, RESTRAINTS OF TRADE, AND UNFAIR TRADE PRAC-
TICES § 770, at 80 (2009) (“[A] monopoly is the practical suppression of effective business
competition which thereby creates a power to control prices to the public harm.”); see also
Monopoly, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The market condition existing when
only one economic entity produces a particular product or provides a particular service.”).
267 Epstein, supra note 15, at 15.
268 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989).
269 The assertion that challenges to the insurance company regulation side of the ACA
should be analyzed under the Penn Central standard is further supported by a recent decision
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In American Council of Life
Insurers v. D.C. Health Benefits Exchange Authority, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160038
(D.D.C. 2014), the district court ruled on a challenge that the D.C. Health Benefit Exchange
Authority unconstitutionally took private property when it assessed a fee on insurance com-
panies doing business in the District. “The Supreme Court’s evaluation of a takings claim
predicated on the allegation, similar to the plaintiff’s here, that a regulation imposes an excessive
or unfair burden is evaluated under the Penn Central factors.” Id. at *69–70.
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insurance company would have to show a recognizable property interest and that the
MLR severely impacted the economic interests of the company and interfered with
its distinct, investment-backed expectations. Further, it would have to show that the
character of the government action approximated a direct appropriation or ouster.270
1. Profits as Property
A threshold matter for the health insurer to overcome is whether or not it can
establish a property right in its profits.271 In order to make an effective Takings
Clause challenge, the health insurer will have to establish an interest “sufficiently
bound up with [its] reasonable expectations . . . to constitute ‘property’ for Fifth
Amendment purposes.”272
The Supreme Court has recently engaged in spirited debate about what is suffi-
cient to constitute a property interest that implicates the Takings Clause.273 Generally,
the Court refuses to find an identifiable property interest for Takings Clause purposes
when a claimant is simply required to pay money—whether to the Government or
to third parties.274
Arguably, requiring the health insurance companies to pay money to a third
party is exactly what the MLR does.275 Part of the argument that the MLR affects an
unconstitutional taking is predicated on the requirement that health insurers issue
rebates to policyholders when their MLR falls below the required minimum.276
Indeed, the MLR cannot be examined as a taking apart from the rebate requirement.
If the ACA simply required that health insurers operate with an MLR of a specified
270 See supra notes 220–27 and accompanying text.
271 See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 544 U.S. 498, 544 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he
Government’s imposition of an obligation . . . must relate to a specific property interest to
implicate the Takings Clause.”); Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) (“[T]his Court has
dismissed ‘taking’ challenges on the ground that, while the challenged government action caused
economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reason-
able expectations of the claimant to constitute ‘property’ for Fifth Amendment purposes.”).
272 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
273 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603–04 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The majority] . . . runs roughshod over Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, which held that the government may impose ordinary financial obligations without
triggering the Takings Clause’s protections.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also
E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 498 (holding, by plurality, that a regulation requiring claimant to pay
money to a third party violated the Takings Clause; however, five justices held that the
Takings Clause did not apply because there was no identifiable property interest).
274 See supra note 196.
275 See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text.
276 See Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 261 (“[I]t is easy to envision scenarios in
which the MLR provision may preclude insurance companies from earning any return on
their investment. It is even possible to envision scenarios in which insurance companies may
be required to pay rebates while operating at a loss.”).
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percentage (and no corresponding penalty for not doing so), there would be no effect
on health insurers that operated at an MLR below the minimum. There could be no
taking because there would be no effect on the business.
Given the decision in Eastern Enterprises, however, the Court would likely con-
sider the profits of the health insurance company a recognizable property interest.277
If the Court declines to find a recognizable property interest, then the inquiry is over
and the MLR survives a constitutional challenge. If, however, the Court finds a prop-
erty interest, then it would move on to the Penn Central analysis.
2. Facial Challenge
A second threshold matter is that a facial challenge to the MLR would certainly
fail. For a facial challenge to succeed, it would mean that “the statute produces an
unconstitutional outcome, in all states of the world, for the parties in question.”278
In the context of a regulatory takings analysis, the health insurance company would
have to show that the MLR results in one of the per se takings: that it is either a per-
manent physical occupation of the company’s property, or that it results in a com-
plete deprivation of all economically beneficial uses of the company’s property.279
There is no situation in which the MLR could be considered a permanent physical
occupation of property. Although the size of the physical occupation is irrelevant for
the analysis,280 any challenge to the MLR would be based on the effect that the regu-
lation has on profits. There is no tenable argument that the MLR effects a physical
appropriation. The only way a health insurer could hope to succeed in challenging the
MLR as a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause would be under the Penn
Central analysis.
3. Penn Central Analysis
Because the Penn Central analysis is ad hoc and fact-intensive, a health insurance
company could only bring a successful takings challenge after it has been negatively
affected by the operation of the MLR.281 The Court would then consider the MLR’s
“‘character’ and ‘economic impact’, asking whether [it] goes beyond ‘adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’ and whether
it ‘interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations.’”282
277 See 524 U.S. at 498; see also supra note 273.
278 Epstein & Stannard, supra note 16, at 244.
279 See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
280 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
281 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (discussing how the Penn
Central question largely rests on impacts on, and interference with, the property interest). In
order for a court to evaluate the severity of the regulation’s economic impact, there must
have been an economic impact; thus, an insurance company could not challenge the MLR
unless and until it has been adversely economically affected. Id.
282 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (2013).
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a. Economic Impact
In order to establish that an economic impact is sufficiently burdensome to effect
a taking, a health insurer would have to prove a considerable economic impact. The
Supreme Court has declined to find a taking when property’s value was diminished
by 75%,283 when property’s value was diminished by 92.5%,284 or when a claimant
was required to pay out 46% of its shareholder equity.285 Further, the Supreme Court
has upheld laws against takings claims even when the regulations prohibited the
continued operation of a previously lawful business.286
Additionally, the Penn Central analysis examines the “parcel as a whole.”287
“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abro-
gated.”288 Thus, a court would examine the impact of the MLR on the entirety of the
company, not just its impact over a particular period of time, in a particular state, or
on a particular area of the health insurer’s business.289 In this way, the larger the health
insurance company is, the less likely it is that it could prove an economic impact
sufficient to establish a taking. If the company had other areas of business that were
not adversely affected by the MLR, it would be less likely that the Court would con-
sider that the business bore an unreasonable economic burden because the com-
pany’s property as a whole would not have been sufficiently adversely affected to
constitute a taking.
Based on this high standard, it is unlikely that the Court would find that the eco-
nomic impact of the MLR was so onerous as to effect a taking.
283 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
284 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915).
285 Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993).
286 United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) (closing gold mines
so that workers would be available for other mining work); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.,
254 U.S. 300 (1920) (prohibiting the continued manufacture of black carbon); Hadacheck,
239 U.S. at 394 (prohibiting the continued operation of claimant’s brickyard); Reinman v.
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (prohibiting the continued operation of claimant’s livery
stable).
287 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 130 n.27 (1978).
288 Id. at 130.
289 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330–31
(2002) (“Certainly, our holding that the permanent ‘obliteration of the value’ of a fee simple
estate constitutes a categorical taking does not answer the question whether a regulation
prohibiting any economic use of land for a 32-month period has the same legal effect. . . . Of
course, defining the property interest taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged
is circular.”); see also Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 644 (“To the extent that any portion of
property is taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however,
is whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question.”).
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b. Interference with Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
In evaluating the MLR’s interference with reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations, the Court would focus on the extent to which health insurers had notice that
they would be subject to regulation similar to the MLR.290
There are two reasons that this part of the test would likely fail to meet the standard
for a taking. First, under any interpretation, health insurers have had significant notice
that they would be subject to regulation similar to the MLR. Health insurance costs
have been rising substantially over the last several decades.291 Healthcare reform has
been a topic of discussion for years, and a federal solution has been on the horizon
at least since the Clinton health plan of 1993.292 Additionally, many states have had
individual MLRs in place for years, and some states have been slowly raising their
MLRs in an effort to increase health insurance company efficiency.293
Second, the longer the MLR is in place, the more evidence there is that companies
in a variety of states are able to meet the federal MLR.294 Some health insurers are able
to operate at a level higher than the federal minimum MLR, indicated by the fact that
they did not pay rebates.295 With information showing that companies are able to
effectively conduct business and maintain profits while operating within the MLR,
individual health insurers who are not able to do so would have a hard time proving
that it is because of the MLR rather than their method of conducting business.
Because health insurers have had significant notice that they would be subject
to regulation like the MLR, and because companies have been able to operate success-
fully under the MLR it is unlikely that the Court would find the MLR’s interference
with reasonable investment-backed expectations so onerous as to effect a taking.
c. Character of the Governmental Action
In evaluating the character of the government action in the MLR, the Court would
focus on how similar the MLR is to a paradigmatic taking or a direct ouster.296 The
character of the governmental action in the MLR would almost certainly cut against
the Court finding that it constitutes a taking.
290 See supra notes 205–20 and accompanying text.
291 See BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 38, at 231 (“Annual expenditures on health care in
the United States are over $2 trillion and rising.”).
292 See generally Robert E. Moffit, A Guide to the Clinton Health Plan, HERITAGE FOUND.
(Nov. 19, 1993), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1993/11/a-guide-to-the-clinton
-health-plan [http://perma.cc/4P8J-W2VG].
293 See, e.g., Medical Loss Ratios for Health Insurance: State Medical Loss Requirements,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance-medical
-loss-rations.aspx#requirements [http://perma.cc/N4JN-4EVZ].
294 See, e.g., 2013 MLR Refunds by State, supra note 76.
295 See id.
296 See supra notes 220–27 and accompanying text.
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The MLR is far from the paradigmatic taking or anything resembling physical
appropriation of private property for a governmental purpose. It does not require that
health insurers allow the government to use their property,297 and it does not require
that health insurers allow third parties to use their property.298
The MLR, especially when taken in the context of the ACA as a whole, is much
more like a public program that simply “adjust[s] the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good.”299 A stated purpose of the MLR is to “ensure . . .
value for consumers so that premiums are used for clinical services and quality im-
provements.”300 The MLR adjusts the burdens of economic life by focusing on value
for health insurance consumers rather than profits and ease of operation for health
insurance companies.301
Additionally, the MLR is like other classes of regulations in which the Court has
held that the character of the governmental action did not constitute a taking. The MLR
promotes “general welfare”302 by attempting to control premium prices.303 Especially
with regulation requiring everyone to have health insurance, lower health insurance
premiums contribute to the general welfare by freeing up more money to be spent in
other ways. Finally, the MLR furthers the “important public polic[y]”304 of “ensur[ing]
adequate participation by health insurance issuers, competition in the health insurance
market . . . , and value for consumers so that premiums are used for clinical services
and quality improvements.”305
Because the character of the governmental action in the MLR is far from the
paradigmatic taking and the regulation is essentially one that adjusts the benefits and
burdens of economic life, it is unlikely that the Court would find the character of the
governmental action the kind which would amount to a taking.
Under the Penn Central analysis, it is not likely that a challenge to the MLR under
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment would succeed. If the Court considers the
insurance company’s expectation of profits to constitute a property right, which it
297 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (taking occurs when
the government temporarily takes over a part of claimant’s leasehold).
298 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (taking
occurs when the government requires claimant to allow third parties to occupy claimant’s
property).
299 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
300 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124 Stat. 119, 136–37 (2010) amended by § 10101,
124 Stat. 119, 885–87 (2010).
301 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
302 Penn Central, U.S. 438 at 125.
303 Although the MLR does not directly address premium rates, the lower an insurance
company’s administrative costs and expenses are, the lower its premiums will need to be to
cover its expenses. In this way, the MLR controls premium prices by controlling administrative
costs and overhead.
304 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
305 § 2718, 124 Stat. at 136–37, amended by § 10101, 124 Stat. at 885–87.
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likely would, a challenge to the MLR would have to meet the high standards of the
Penn Central ad hoc, fact-intensive balancing test. The MLR’s economic impact and
its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations would likely not be
sufficient for the Court to find a taking. Additionally, the character of the governmental
action is very unlike that of the paradigmatic taking and very similar to regulations
that merely adjust the benefits and burdens of economic life. The Penn Central stan-
dard is deferential to regulation, and claimants bear a substantial burden in proving
a taking.306 It is unlikely that the MLR could bear that burden.
CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the MLR is likely to be one of the next legal challenges
to the ACA. Most of the scholarly work examining the constitutionality of the MLR to
this point has applied the wrong constitutional analysis, resulting in the conclusion
that the MLR effects an unconstitutional taking of private property. This Note attempts
to rectify that error. It is not appropriate to apply the public utility rate-making analysis
to the MLR because public utilities operate as monopolies. The focus of rate-making,
and thus the constitutional analysis, in the public utility context is very different than
it is in the highly competitive health insurance industry. This is why the Supreme
Court has developed different constitutional standards to govern public utility rate-
making and regulatory takings of private property.
The proper constitutional standard to analyze the MLR is the regulatory takings
doctrine governed by the Penn Central analysis. Under Penn Central, the MLR will
not be struck down as unconstitutional because it will not have an economic impact on
health insurance companies sufficient to frustrate their reasonable investment-backed
expectations. Moreover, the character of the governmental action is not similar to
the paradigmatic taking in which the government appropriates private property for
its own use. The MLR simply adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life for the
public good and is a constitutional regulation of health insurance companies.
306 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
